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# Latin America Report

No. 2241



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## LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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BRIEFS

BOLIVIAN GAS TO ARGENTINA-Bolivian Government oil deposits has reported that its exports of natural gas to Argentina totaled \$204.4 million during the period January-November this year. This figure shows an increase of 109.5 percent over the 1979 export figures. [PY271259 La Paz Radio Illimani Network in Spanish 1130 GMT 27 Dec 80]

CSO: 3010

## BRIEFS

OIL PRODUCTION, ELECTRICAL ENERGY--The production of oil and electrical energy increased 4.4 and 8.2 percent respectively during the first 11 months of 1980 in comparison to the same period in 1979. Oil production reached 2,405,200 cubic meters in November. The total oil production during the first 11 months of 1980 reached 26,095,000. Natural gas reached 9,126,700,000 cubic meters. Oil imports during the first 11 months of 1980 reached 2,117,700 cubic meters, representing an increase of 17.9 percent over 1979, and cost \$448,599,400, representing an increase of 44.2 percent. [Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 31 Dec 80 p 1]

CSO: 3010

## BRIEFS

OIL, GAS PIPELINES--The Energy and Hydrocarbons Ministry has reported that Bolivian Government oil deposits will expand its pipeline system during 1981. The following projects are now underway: a gas pipeline to the north-central Altiplano region; a gas Yacuiba-Tarija; an expansion of the Monteagudo-Sucre gas pipeline and its extension to Potosi; an oil pipeline from the Porvenir oilfield to Nancorainza, where it will join the Camiri-Santa Cruz pipeline which ends at the Palma Sola refinery. [PY090057 La Paz Radio Illimani Network in Spanish 1130 GMT 8 Jan 81]

CSO: 3010

## BRIEFS

PETROLEUM CHARTER APPROVED--During a meeting held yesterday the National Economic Coordination Council definitely approved the organic charter of the new mixed company called Paraguayan Petroleum [Petroleos Paraguayos--Petropar]. The meeting of this important government council lasted 3 hours and was presided over by President Alfredo Stroessner and attended by all of its members. At the end of the meeting, during which other subjects were also analyzed, it was officially disclosed that the council had approved the organic charter for Petropar. Spokesmen of the information under secretariat of the presidency did not give any further details on the subject and stated that, in view of our request, the finance or industry and commerce ministry would release detailed information. However, this did not take place since the text of the company charter, which will deal with the issues related to petroleum in our country, was not released by any of the two ministries. It was learned that the document consists of approximately 44 articles and that it was drawn up jointly by technical teams of the finance ministry and the industry and commerce ministry headed by Eulalio R. Palacios and Luis Ortiz Ramirez. [Excerpt] [PY081646 Asuncion ABC COLOR in Spanish 8 Jan 81 p 13]

CSO: 3010



## 'CONSENSUS' ON ORINOCO DEVELOPMENT DEEMED IMPOSSIBLE

Caracas RESUMEN in Spanish 7 Dec 80 pp 30-32

[Article by Gustavo Coronel: "Information, Consultation or Consensus on the Belt"]

[Text] I. A Consensus on the Dispute

The national government has decided to seek out a consensus regarding the draft agreement worked out by the negotiating teams of Colombia and Venezuela for settling the two countries' dispute over the demarcation of marine and under-water areas in the Gulf of Venezuela and has told the country that an agreement would not be signed unless such a consensus existed. It so happens, however, that a consensus, in the most precise meaning of the word (as found on page 346 of the 19th edition of the Dictionary of the Spanish Language) is totally impossible to achieve because it necessitates the assent of all of the persons in the group, in this case, the country.

## A Decision That Has Already Been Made

I wonder, then, whether the government never wanted the draft agreement approved, in which case it would seem clear that it quite cruelly and inconsiderately sacrificed the group of men who worked hard and patriotically on drawing up the agreement, or whether on the contrary, the government has been the victim of its own lack of precision in saying what it really wanted. If the latter were the case, it would seem clear that the government has made a sizable mistake in the way it presented the problem for the consideration of the public. As a result of the government's practically pointblank search for this consensus, all of the country's sectors have felt the almost physiological and gut-level need to point out defects in the draft pact, almost all of which are correctable defects of form. Because there are so many of them, however, they take on the appearance of a deeper, more conceptual rejection, which will make it very difficult to achieve a quick solution to this irritating problem. We have no doubt that the country ought to ratify the agreement as outlined in the government's draft, with the modifications of form that could have been introduced, and that postponing ratification much longer is decidedly disadvantageous for Venezuela, both politically, socially and economically.

I would prefer, however, to speak about the future, about what can still be done in one way or another. I would like to talk about the Orinoco Belt, because this

is the issue now occupying the attention of Venezuelans, as did a few weeks ago the "Sierra Nevada," the universities' budget deficit, the 1981 federal budget or the Orinoco tragedy or as in the near, as well as fleeting, future, it will be occupied by the case of the deputy who "industriously" earned a living by selling meat earmarked for poor children to restaurants for the wealthy.

## II. What Should Be Done With the Orinoco Belt?

As Venezuelans know quite well by now, the Orinoco Belt is an extensive area on the northern bank of the Orinoco River from Guarico State in the west to the Amacuro Delta in the east. The subsoil of the Orinoco Belt contains very sizable hydrocarbon resources that the country decided a number of years ago to develop. There are three main stages in the development of these resources:


1. A stage of quantifying the resources, which will be essentially completed by 1983.
2. A stage of developing output potential. This stage has already begun, parallel to the first stage, in areas such as Hamaca-Pao, under the responsibility of Meneven. The aim of this second stage is to add a million barrels a day to the country's production potential by the year 2000.
3. A stage of enhancing the crudes produced there. This stage will also begin parallel to the second stage and will aim at altering the characteristics of the crude oils to make them more marketable and valuable on world markets. This stage calls for desulfurization, removing metals and boosting the API gravity, in other words, making them more appealing to consumers.

### 1. The Quantification Stage

The stage of quantifying the hydrocarbon resources in the Orinoco Belt began in 1979. In order to achieve maximum efficiency and an optimum utilization of available manpower and materials, the belt was divided into four areas, to be explored and quantified by the four operating companies (See map). Some 150 exploratory wells have been drilled and hundreds of kilometers of seismographic lines have been surveyed in the 2 years since this stage began. Semiproven reserves of around 1.5 billion barrels have been established, in other words, reserves with a high degree of certainty. All four areas have proven to contain hydrocarbons, which has reinforced the belief that there are immense hydrocarbon resources in the belt. Hence, the belt is an unquestionable reality.

### 2. The Development Stage

A production potential development stage also began in 1979 in some of the best known areas in the belt closest to traditional production areas. We should recall that for years now the Jobo, Pilon and Morichal fields and the Meneven production areas south of San Tome have been producing 100,000 barrels a day in the belt. What started in 1979 were efforts to boost output by some 225,000 barrels a day by 1988, with 100,000 barrels a day coming from the area assigned to Meneven (Guanipa 100 Project) and some 125,000 barrels a day from the zone



**Key:**

### 1. PDVSA [Venezuelan Petroleum, Inc] Assigned Areas of Responsibility

assigned to Lagoven (Cerro Negro Project).. These are two different projects, as the Meneven project involves, for at least the next 10 years, conventional production and the use of lighter crudes to produce a mixture of some 16-17 degrees API, whereas the Lagoven program calls for the on site enhancement of the production crude through the installation of a delayed coking plant, which will yield a lighter fraction that can be marketed and a coke-type residue that can be utilized as a fuel source.

After 1983, some of the areas quantified by Maraven and Corpoven might also be brought into production, if the president approves, to help reach the goal of one million barrels a day of output by the end of the century.

### 3. The Enhancement Stage

The crude oil produced in the belt has unappealing market characteristics and, therefore, must be enhanced. The enhancement consists of transforming a very viscous crude of some 9 degrees API, 3.5 percent sulfur and some 800 parts per million of metals into a product of some 20 degrees API, 0.5 percent sulfur and some 100 parts per million of metals. There are several proven technological processes, as well as some in the testing stage, for bringing about this

radical transformation. These processes include "Flexicoker," the hydro-metal separation plant, the "Aurobon" process, deep hydrodesulfurization and a number of others. All of these processes are under consideration, and some of them are being applied by the national oil industry.

### III. Information, Consultation or Consensus

The government has decided, sensibly, to inform and consult at length with public opinion regarding the belt, what the plans are for it and how the plans are to be carried out. The government has also sensibly stated with categorical clarity that the responsibility for the decisions made in connection with the belt cannot be delegated and, therefore, will remain in the hands of the Executive Branch and the oil sector. In contrast to what happened with the Colombian-Venezuelan dispute, this time the government will not be looking for a consensus, which, as we know, is impossible to achieve regardless of the issue involved. What it will do is continue to inform, to systematize that information and to engage in a process of consultation with bodies such as FEDECAMARAS [Association of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry], Pro-Venezuela, professional groups, associations of geologists, petroleum engineers and consulting engineers, the Petroleum Chamber, political parties, universities and other equally important institutions.


The objective of this process will be to sound out the views of these groups on the development of the belt and incorporate into the Development Master Plan the suggestions, ideas, opinions, views, etc that the Executive Branch and the oil sector consider constructive so that the plan can be better implemented.

What sort of opinions would be particularly welcome? Those which would aim at making this a project for comprehensive development, not just an oil project, but a project that is coordinated with the entire region in mind. We want to move into the Orinoco Belt with a broadminded approach, with the best wishes for achieving our main goal of extracting the hydrocarbons it contains but at the same time with the intention of harmoniously integrating oil-producing activities with agricultural development and the development of the communities in which we will have to operate. We want to go in and create prosperity, not ruin, to enhance the quality of life for people in the region, not to lessen it, to protect the environment, not to worsen it.

The oil industry has proven many times that it is the industry most dedicated to the improvement of the environment. The many sewage treatment plants that have been built, the massive forestation programs that are under way, the spotless petroleum communities, and the firm support for the country's traditional conservation associations are examples that cannot be overlooked. Hence, I feel that even while willingly acknowledging the concerns of very recently formed conservationist groups, public opinion should be on the alert to differentiate between genuine, good faith concern for environmental protection and a political and ideological rejection of Orinoco Belt development. It is regrettable to see how several worthy conservationist associations are being taken over by representatives of extremist ideologies who are against the

development of the belt for reasons of political strategy and who have no scruples about using these conservationist groups to disguise their message, an essentially paranoid message, with the more appealing and irreproachable cloak of concern for the environment.

The pace of development of the belt is another facet in which we have to sound out views. Will it be fast, will it be slow? CENDES [Development Studies Center] is against the rapid development of the belt, arguing that the investment required would outstrip the country's investment capabilities. Is this true? Should we produce less in the belt than the country needs? (See chart of production potential forecast below.)



**Key:**

1. Millions of barrels a day
2. Production potential forecast
3. Orinoco oil belt
4. Adjacent areas (including south of the lake)
5. Offshore
6. F/XF
7. Traditional areas
8. L/M



Another area of interest ought to be an analysis of the revenue that the country receives from nonpetroleum sectors versus the contributions of the oil sector. The Venezuelan budget for 1981 is around 70 billion bolivars. What sector could replace oil in meeting these lavish needs? Tourism? Iron? Aluminum? Fishing? All Venezuelans know the sad answer. The petroleum industry is the only sector that can be of significant help in meeting these needs. Either we produce more oil or we will simply not have enough money to pay our bills.

There is, of course, another way out: spending less, scaling back expenditures and the country itself in accordance with our current revenue generating capacity. This is a valid alternative, but it depends on the political sector, not on us in the oil sector. This option would force us to become an efficient, sober, unpolluted, hard-working, austere, simple, plan-ahead country devoted to savings. I am totally, absolutely in favor of this option, but when I look about me, I find, sadly, a volatile, greedy and corrupt country; political parties sapped by internal strife; a country contaminated by an irritating nouveau riche style and characterized by the intolerable mediocrity of those who feel that the primary thing "is to be important instead of useful."

Since Venezuela would not seem to possess the moral or spiritual reserves to become a simple, austere country (I hope I am wrong), our oil will have to continue paying the old bills of the previous administration, as well as the new bills of the current one.

There seems to be no other solution in the foreseeable future. In short, let's provide information about the belt, let's consult with each other about the belt, but let's also do what we have to do in the belt. This is a country that has to get moving and that cannot submit each one of its moves to a consensus, which by definition will always be impossible to achieve.

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## BRIEFS

**EXPORT REGULATIONS**--The Agriculture and Livestock Secretariat has enforced new sanitary control measures for lumber exports from Chile. Lumber exports from Chile will now be authorized only when they carry the proper sanitary certificate issued by Chilean authorities. [PY062203 Buenos Aires Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 6 Jan 81]

**ARGENTINE-BOLIVIAN RIVER PROJECT**--La Paz, 6 Jan (AFP)--The Bolivian Agriculture Ministry has reported that Argentina and Bolivia will carry out joint projects to exploit the Bermejo River basin. The project includes water control, exploitation and commercialization of natural resources and the connection of production centers with national and foreign consumption centers. [PY070131 Paris AFP in Spanish 1611 GMT 6 Jan 81]

**VATICAN PROPOSAL ENDORSEMENT**--Buenos Aires, 7 Jan (NA)--Militants from the many Argentine political parties expressed today their support for the establishment of a "peace zone" as has been proposed by the Vatican to solve the border dispute between Chile and Argentina. They noted that the establishment of a peace zone "seems like a good possibility to solve the border dispute in a peaceful manner." They also said that "the mediation has helped the Argentine and Chilean people--by issuing many statements through their representatives--to play an important role in this process." This statement is included in a letter that was submitted today to Mgr Claudio Delli, the secretary of the Apostolic Nunciature. The letter is to be delivered to Pope John Paul II and it is signed by 45 citizens. The letter was handed over to Delli, who is in charge of the Apostolic Nunciature following the departure of Mgr Pio Laghi, by a delegation made up of Emilio Permin Mignone (Justicialist Party); Alberto Guerberooff (Popular Leftist Front); and Jacobo Fariñas (Revolutionary Communist Party). [Excerpt] [PY071830 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1715 GMT 7 Jan 81]

**YACYRETA BINATIONAL BUDGET**--Spokesmen of the Yacyreta Binational Enterprise have reported that a budget of \$708.7 million has been approved for 1981, and that this represents a cut of close to \$1 billion from the original estimated budget. \$111.2 million will go for engineering and administration, \$82 million for preliminary studies, \$317 million for main civil engineering projects, \$14 million for energy equipment, \$40.7 million for the purchase of land and \$74.6 million for relocations. [PY181730 Asuncion ABC COLOR in Spanish 18 Dec 80 p 12]

CSO: 3010

## BRIEFS

**WHEAT PRODUCTION ESTIMATE**--The Agriculture and Livestock Secretariat has estimated that wheat production for the 1980-81 period may reach 7,830,000 tons, which represents a decrease of 3.3 percent. [Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 31 Dec 80 pp 1, 4]

**LARGE NUMBER BANKRUPTCIES**--The concentration of commercial bankruptcies in December of last year, measured in terms of declared liabilities, added up to 979,653 million pesos and pushed the grand total of 1980 to 2,091,230 million pesos. This means that there has been a nominal growth of 166 percent and a real growth of 64 percent in comparison to 1979. The most important bankruptcy of last month was Sasstru with 450,691 million pesos, followed by that of Tupungato with 132,700 million and Federal with 95,900 million. According to the latest report of the specialized magazine "VERITAS," the grand total of 1979 bankruptcies was 778,580 million pesos, that is 1,312,650 million pesos less than that of 1980. In the meantime, if we were to estimate the accumulated increase of wholesale prices in 1980 at 63 percent, the comparative increase of liabilities in 1980 over 1979 in terms of buying power, has reached the above-mentioned 64 percent, amounting to 2,091,230 million pesos. According to the monthly magazine, there were 625 bankruptcies in 1979 and 713 in 1980, which indicated that enterprises which have been carrying very heavy debts went bankrupt last year. The above-mentioned report points out that last December holds the record for 1980 both regarding to the number of bankruptcies and the amount of declared liabilities involved. There were 116 bankruptcies against 59 in December 1979, while liabilities amounted to 979,653 million pesos and 182,122 million pesos respectively. To give an idea of the size of liabilities declared last month we could point out that during the first 11 months of the year the overall amount of liabilities declared was 1,121,887 million pesos, while during the first 10 months it was 1,061,505 million pesos. [Text] [PY051131 Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish 2 Jan 81 p 6]

**LABOR UNION PROTEST**--The 13,800 workers of the light and power labor union have signed a petition addressed to their union's military interventor protesting the "unilateral amendment of the labor contract" and demanding an "emergency" salary hike. The workers who signed the petition addressed to the military interventor, Lt Col Jose Mancini, work at the Greater Buenos Aires Electrical Services (SEGBA) and the former Italo-Argentina Power Company. In their petition the workers indicated that the amendment to the labor contract "is an arbitrary, unexpected and unilateral action which has been carried out over your head as the interventor of this union, and with total disregard for our legitimate rights." The workers added that "this arbitrary action cannot be tolerated silently" by the direct



victims of this plundering of gains which were over 30 years old. [Excerpt]  
[PY042010 Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish 2 Jan 81 p 5]

**JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES ACTIVITIES**--Buenos Aires, 6 Jan (TELAM)--The Foreign Ministry officially reported this afternoon that the government has again permitted the activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses after 4 and 1/2 years of prohibition under Decree No 1,867/76, which was recently repealed. The new Decree No 2,683/80 which annuls the prohibition also permits the operation of the Torre Del Vigia, a biblical tract association which printed the books and pamphlets of the sect. The information supplied by the San Martin Palace adds that according to the provisions of Law No 21,745, approved and promulgated after the annulled decree, the legal functioning of noncatholic religions is subject to the fulfillment of several requirements and they should also adjust themselves to the law of the country in their public and private manifestations. The Jehovah's Witnesses hold beliefs of a Judeo-Christian origin and among other things they maintain that only divinity should be revered. Therefore, they reject all symbolism of material objects, and that is the origin of their frictions with national customs, since they also refuse all reverence to national symbols: flag, national anthem and so forth. It should be noted that the repealed decree did not prohibit the beliefs, but only their public activities or manifestations--which now are legal again on condition that their activities be adjusted to the provisions of Law No 21,745. [Text] [PY071638 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 2257 GMT 6 Jan 81]

**FISCAL DEFICIT**--The fiscal deficit for the first 11 months of 1980 was 6.5 trillion pesos, double the 1979 deficit for the same period, and was covered almost wholly with the printing of currency, according to a national treasury report made public yesterday. The deficit exceeded all official expectations, and forced the government to resort to printing currency, going against the economic guidelines it has set itself, to cover it. [PY112002 Buenos Aires HERALD in English 9 Jan 81 p 9]

**COST OF LIVING**--The cost of living rose 3.8 percent in December, bringing the cost of living increase for 1980 to 87.6 percent. Wholesale prices went up 0.9 percent and 57.7 percent for the whole year. Building costs rose 3.8 percent for December and 102 percent for the year. [PY112002 Buenos Aires HERALD in English 11 Jan 81 p 1]

CSO: 3010

## CLERGY DIVIDED OVER GRASSROOTS ECCLESIASTIC COMMUNITIES

Sao Paulo VEJA in Portuguese 17 Dec 80 pp 20-22

[Unattributed Article: "The Divided Clergy"]

[Text] The target of sharp barbs hurled by the usually moderate Cardinal Aloisio Lorscheider in an interview granted to TV VERDES MARES of Fortaleza, Planalto Palace has not had a chance to reply--and when it replies will probably begin another exchange of thrusts with religious leaders. Before that takes place, other influential members of the clergy will take on the battle and the government, surprised and happy, can continue to recover from the expulsion of Father Vito Miracapillo and be the careful spectator of a debate which once more exposes the divisions existing in the hierarchy of the immense structure of the Catholic Church in Brazil.

"The system is sinful," declared Dom Aloisio in the interview, in the midst of just criticisms of the social imbalances observed in the country. Heatedly, from the studio, the archbishop of Fortaleza warned the government of the need to change "its behavior, its positions and its policies," if it did not want to lose elections in the municipalities where the Grassroots Ecclesiastic Communities [CEB]--religious groups increasingly influenced by political activists--are flourishing (see box on opposite page). Asked to make an analysis of the party situation, Dom Aloisio maintained that the PDS [Social Democratic Party] contains that which is the most "reactionary, fawning and careerist of the old ARENA [National Renewal Alliance]," that the PP [Popular Party] "is the spokesman for the great bourgeoisie associated with imperialism;" the PTB [Brazilian Labor Party] of former Deputy Ivette Vargas is "controlled by Planalto," and he associated the PDT [Democratic Workers Party] of former Governor Leonel Brizola with "German Social Democrats." Remaining within what the archbishop of Fortaleza calls the "consistent opposition," is the PT [Workers Party] of Luis Inacio da Silva and the PTDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party]--the later, however, with reservations: Dom Aloisio believes that the opposition standards are in the hands of the members of the "popular faction" of the party. This reservation made, television viewers of VERDES MARES were regaled with praise for the PT, precisely the party which has garnered the most supporters among the thousands of grassroots communities scattered throughout the country.

## Murmurs in the Corridors

Immediately, signals on different wave lengths began to be transmitted in other parts of the country, primarily activated by the return of the controversial grassroots communities to the center of political news. Dom Ivo Lorscheiter, secretary of the CNBB [National Conference of Brazilian Bishops], restricted himself to saying that "The Church is anticommunist." In Rio, on a higher note, Cardinal Eugenio Salles made new restrictions to "the presence of infiltrated elements" in the CEB. If he wanted, Dom Eugenio could illustrate his short statement with many examples, which today are only murmured about in the corridors of the episcopal palaces.

In Sao Paulo, the CEB of the region of Santo Amaro have been undermined for some time by the activities of Popular Action (AP), the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) and the 8 October Revolutionary Movement (MR-8). In the 1978 elections, an alliance of the AP and the MR-8 supported the candidacy of metal worker Aurelio Peres to the Chamber of Deputies. Another alliance, that of the AP and the PCdoB, contributed decisively to taking teacher Irma Passoni to the Legislative Assembly. Examples of this type multiply in other states, although as Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns, archbishop of Sao Paulo, says, it is obvious that "attempts to infiltrate the CEB are not only by leftist sectors or opposition parties but by all parties indiscriminately."

Without delving into the ideological details of the CEB, Dom Helder Camara, archbishop of Olinda and Recife, was a little more explicit than his cautious companions in the controversy. "It is necessary to define the CEB and their role in society carefully," declared Dom Helder. "The actions of Brother Beto in the ABC [Industrial sections of Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo do Campo and Sao Caetano do Sul], strike, for example, is an affair which needs to be reappraised." Dom Paulo Evaristo preferred to transfer the examination of the work of the Dominican activist in the movement led by Luis Inacio da Silva, to whom Brother Bento gives spiritual, but above all, political advice, to another diocese. "He was never active in Sao Paulo, always in Santo Andre, said Cardinal Arns. "The one to make the judgement is the bishop, Dom Claudio Hummes.

## Fuel On The Fire

"The Church cannot make choices for others," says Dom Luciano Mendes de Almeida, CNBB secretary general, in a discreet allusion to the party preferences listed by Dom Aloisio. "The Church, and specifically the CEB, seeks to train people to choose a party but they do not identify with any of them." Dom Avelar Brandao Vilela, finally, says that "The decision to vote is one of personal conscience by a Catholic, when it is a matter of parties which are not against Christian principles, and none of them are." In that round of statements, practically the entire hierarchy of the Church in Brazil adds fuel to the fire lit by Dom Aloisio Lorscheider.

Apparently surprised by the effects of a controversy that exploded three weeks before Christmas, last weekend the divided pastors left the scene: Dom Aloisio Lorscheider went to Palmeira das Missoes in Rio Grande do Sul, Dom Helder was admitted to the Mayo Clinic in the United States, and the other cardinals considered the affair closed. It is not. It is true that this time there was no crisis between the Church and the State, nor did the interview of the archbishop of Fortaleza ruin his image as a respected spokesman with Planalto Palace, particularly with President Joao Figueiredo. The problem of the CBE's however, is far from being resolved.

Advisers to Dom Aloisio explained that on the day of the Ceara television program the cardinal was returning from a visit to the drought-stricken region, and particularly impressed after contemplating so much misery, he concluded by raising his usual speaking voice several decibels. It is improbable that the former president of the CNBB will swell the Planalto Palace list, which is headed by the bishops Dom Pedro Caldaliga and Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns.

A man of conciliatory temperament, Dom Aloisio's past only reveals two relevant conflicts with the government. In 1970 he was held for four hours at the DOI-CODI [Department of Domestic Operations-Internal Operations Center] of Rio de Janeiro, during which time he was interrogated on the activities of Young Catholic Workers (JOC). In July of this year he lost some points with Planalto because his aides prevented the army from handling security for Pope John Paul II during his visit to Fortaleza.

The file on the CBE is much thicker now and could soon cool the not too warm relations between the Church and the State unless the religious hierarchy manages to correct the growing tendency of the groups, which created to strengthen the Church, today are strengthening political parties.

#### A Network of 100,000 Communities

During the period of the most acute political repression, the Grassroots Ecclesiastic Communities (CEB) served as the natural shelter for almost all the factions of the Brazilian Left. In halls maintained by the Church on the outskirts of Sao Paulo, for example, there emerged surprising alliances among Popular Action, the 8 October Revolutionary Movement and the Communist Party of Brazil. However, the political opening made that ideological association untenable, particularly after several forces contained in it went to war against each other. Now, finally, the Church hierarchy is seeking to cool the militant ardor of its communities, over many of which it no longer has much or any control.

The CEB's as they are called in the Church, were born of the liberalizing winds blown by Vatican Council II. Their pioneering is attributed to the parish of Nisia Floresta in Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, which created a community in 1965. The Church itself does not know exactly how many groups of that type exist today.

The first attempt at counting them in 1973, counted 40,000 CEB's throughout the country. At this time they probably number 100,000 with more than 2 million members. They gained notoriety as of 1968 when the Medellin Conference in Colombia caused the appearance of the "theology of liberation" and the communities very

often concern themselves more with society than with the spiritual principles of Catholicism.

These groups do not answer to a central headquarters nor to a rigid organization. They depend, basically, on the bishop of the diocese in which they are located. They arise from regional peculiarities--in Paraiba they appeared to help tenant farmers threatened with eviction; in Goias to save a community school and in Sao Paulo, to improve coexistence among the inhabitants of a building. Their growth is generally attributed to the shortage of priests. However, it is true that because of the absence of a permanent vigilance by the Church hierarchy, in many cases they have become uncontrollable cells of leftist militancy.

#### Bishop Discontinues Blessing Banks

A former member of the conservative wing of the Church and today a member of the large bloc of centrist prelates, the archbishop of Curitiba, Dom Pedro Fedalto, apparently has begun to flirt with the religious left. After blessing the newest branch of the Banorte in Parana, the archbishop chose to advocate, before a surprised flock of politicians, businessmen and bankers, the need for a better distribution of national revenues. Hardly had he finished the sermon than Dom Pedro was interrupted by the president of the Parana Commercial Association, Carlos Alberto de Oliveira, who called him a "useful dupe." At his side, Deputy Hermes Macedo denied that the poor are becoming poorer. "Never have so many blenders, refrigerators and mixers been sold in the country," declared Macedo, basing himself on the prosperity of his chain of stores.

The archbishop was rescued from the distressing dialog by the tailor and integralist leader, Rui Lacerda, who led the retreat by Dom Pedro in the direction of an automobile. "He fell into a den of vipers," says Lacerda.

Far from the place of the squabble, Dom Pedro explained: "I do not like to bless banks. The guests drink whiskey and talk and pay no attention to the true meaning of the ceremony." After the clash, he achieved the status of "persona non grata" among Parana businessmen. In return, he promises not to bless other credit or business establishments.

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## FINDINGS OF 1980 CENSUS REVEALED, MIGRATIONS CONTINUE

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 28 Dec 80 pp 16-18

[Text] There were 2.8 million migrants, who with bowed heads and battered suitcases unloaded from trains without any money in their pockets and no professional training or skills. For 10 years they made those trips, leaving behind what little they had in Parana and Minas Gerais to come live in the new "Eldorado" of Sao Paulo, no longer to the capital, but to the interior, where the number of new industries requiring manpower is growing.

The migrants left fertile lands after coffee plantations were replaced by wheat and soybean fields and manpower gave way to tractors and modern machines. No one noticed it, not even the research institutes which annually issue publications on population growth based on projections and surveys, but the phenomenon took place: The interior of Sao Paulo today has 25 million inhabitants, almost a fifth of the population of the country. In addition to Sao Paulo, other states had a high rate of demographic growth, but even so, the southeast and northeast regions continued to be the most populous. On this and subsequent pages, the results of Census-80 are analyzed. The survey is by the network of branch offices and correspondents of ESTADO with the final text by Pedro Zan.

## Origins: Minas and Parana

The almost 3 million migrants who came to live in the state of Sao Paulo in the last decade exceeded the population estimates of all the research institutes and the results of censuses taken during the last 40 years. The SEADE Foundation (State Data Analysis System) expected to count 1.8 million new migrants in the state, but its technicians had to revamp their calculations after the IBGE [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics] announced that there were 2.8 million. Up to now there is no official explanation for that population growth.

If that trend continues, and growth continues at around 3.48 percent per year, Sao Paulo will have one of the largest populations in the world by the end of the decade. Today, 25.3 million people live in the state. Migration, decline in the infant mortality rate and the maintenance of birth rates, as in Sao Paulo, were the main reasons responsible for population growth in the majority of the states of the country.

Most of the new migrants to Sao Paulo came from Parana but were born in Minas Gerais. They traded work in the fields with a hoe for a job in one of the many offices and industries which appeared in recent years in the interior of the state. They preferred the interior and the metropolitan area, which however had a decline in its population growth rate, going from 5.56 percent in the decade of the 60's to 4.45 percent in the 70's, a rate still considered very high.

The population growth rate in the interior of Sao Paulo was 3.38 percent, exceeding that of the 60's (3.33 percent) and very close to that of the capital, which is now 3.66 percent. The interior was the only Sao Paulo region which had an increase in the population growth rate; the rest--the capital and the metropolitan area--showed a decline by comparison with the decade of the 60's.

The population of the two states which provided the most migrants to Sao Paulo--Parana and Minas Gerais--sought to move to cities such as Americana, Indaiatuba, Jacarei, Sao Jose dos Campos, Santa Barbara do Oeste, Votorantim, Salto and Campinas.

Wherever the migrants settled, the results were immediate. They doubled the population of many cities (in some cases such as that of Sumare, it even quadrupled) which were beginning to have a great economic development. The coincidence encouraged the development of industries, which had transferred from the metropolitan area to the interior, obeying the phenomenon of decentralization, and needed a labor force.

It was the migrants' salvation. Those who came from Parana to Sao Paulo were forced to abandon that state because of the replacement of coffee plantations by wheat and soybean fields and because of the end of agricultural expansion. Some of the farmers went to Paraguay, where nearly 600,000 Brazilians live today, Mato Grosso do Sul and Rondonia. The rest sought developing cities with good infrastructures in Sao Paulo.

More than any of the states of the country, Parana felt that decline: its population growth rate in the last decade was .94 percent, the smallest in the country. The IBGE forecast the state would have as many as 10.2 million inhabitants but actually there were no more than 7.7 million. One of the beneficiaries of that migration, the Territory of Rondonia, had the greatest population growth rate of the country: 400 percent. Today the territory has 500,000 inhabitants, while the population expected by the IBGE was 172,000.

Many of the migrants who arrived in Sao Paulo are illiterate or barely able to sign their name (31.43 percent), and the majority are young and single (47.73 percent). The men were accustomed to working in the fields, while the women interviewed were classified under the heading of "domestic servants." The migrants had also had experience in industrial activities (14.58 percent) and commercial and services activities (18.08 percent). That information is from the last survey made by the SEADE Foundation throughout the state.

Could the government have prevented the migration from Parana to Sao Paulo by giving priority to new and diversified agricultural activities? The majority of experts in migrations believe it could have. In practice, however, nothing was done. Of the migrants who came from Parana, many are Sao Paulo residents who left the western region of the state in the decade of the 60's during the expansion of the agricultural frontier. The Sao Paulo emigrants worked in the coffee groves and agriculture until that work was gone. With the increase in pasture areas and with mechanization and the introduction of modern technology, they returned to their places of origin.

However, there are differences between the exodus and the return of the Sao Paulo natives from Parana. In the decade of the 60's they left the rural area to go to work in the interior of Parana. Now they are returning but they no longer want to live from agriculture. They seek employment in the industries located in the cities but not all of them find it. A large number of them swell the ranks of the migrant workers, while a small number of them go to work in the soybean, wheat and sugarcane farms having a high degree of mechanization.

The excessive increase in migration toward Sao Paulo should have had some effects on the living standards of the population but that did not happen. Mortality rates in the state, for example, were never as low as they are today. In regions such as that of Ribeirao Preto and Presidente Prudente, the rates are 24.45 and 29.95 per 1,000 live births respectively. Such rates can be compared with those of developed countries.

The president of the IBGE, Jesse Montello, says that the doubts of Sao Paulo experts on the numbers obtained by the institute "can only be answered when the work of investigating the migratory flows of the country is completed." Preliminary figures will only be known in July, but only in 1982 will they be officially revealed and considered definitive.

In Parana, however, partial results are already enough to worry the population and state experts. More than half of the 295 municipalities of the state registered a decline in population in absolute terms. The most affected was the city of Ivatuga, which had a decline in the number of inhabitants from 13,928 to 2,838 in the last 10 years. Of the 24 microregions into which Parana is divided, eight of them showed a negative growth. This happened mainly in the places where agricultural activities predominate.

In the Umuarama microregion, there was a decline in population of more than 160,000 people. Even in the northern part of the state where the government intended to create a new metropolitan region, only the Londrina microregion had a positive population growth. The 1975 census estimated there were 283,000 people there and it expected there would be more than 400,000 in 1980. The results, however, were modest: Londrina has 309,000 inhabitants today.

Parana Secretary of Planning Vespero Mendes admits that nearly 900,000 people left the state in the decade of the 70's. That made it the greatest "exporter" of poverty of the country. The state reduced its share of the population of the country from 7.4 percent to 6.3 percent. Vespero Mendes accepts that situation with tranquility: "There was a stabilization in the population growth rate, which in past decades was explosive."



Agriculture itself had to be adapted to that new situation. In the past 5 years more than 76,000 farms disappeared. They were annexed to larger farms. However, the population exodus must be responsible for the possible lack of manpower in agriculture.

As in any phenomenon, that of Parana has also had positive results. It decreased the pressure for jobs throughout the state and there was a sudden increase in income per capita, which jumped from nearly \$500 to \$600. The income of the population of Sao Paulo will probably be reduced as a result of the great migration. The majority of the migrants have no professional skills nor do they have even the minimum levels of schooling.

#### The Greatest Population Growth Is in the North

In Alagoas, the growth was less than expected in the past decade. The population, which should be around two million inhabitants, was not more than 1.5 million, for the first time showing a decline. When providing the provisional figures, the local IBGE delegation does not cite the causes for the decline in the number of inhabitants. But the rural exodus from 15 agricultural production municipalities is pointed out as being mainly responsible for that decline.

State technicians, however, have another explanation for the phenomenon: "The lack of interest shown by government policy in the agricultural sector contributed greatly to the rural exodus, at least in Alagoas, where the municipalities considered the great food producers are being abandoned by their inhabitants." The great surprise in the state was the 216-percent increase in population in the municipality of Roteiro, 89 kilometers from Maceio. The people in that city left fishing activities to go work in a new alcohol distillery.

In Paraiba, population growth was small but greater than that of Alagoas. The number of inhabitants increased from 2.3 million to 2.8 million, a growth of 500,000 people in the decade. The decline in population did not only happen in the places affected by drought, but also where there is a scant supply of manpower. There was no shortage of exceptions: The number of people increased in the hinterlands affected by the drought, places such as Cajazeiras, Patos, Pombal and Souza.

The drought, slow industrial growth and low agricultural productivity affected demographic growth in Paraiba. In Sergipe, there was almost no population growth. The population went from 900,000 to 1.1 million, and the city which grew the most was Aracaju. That was expected because of the migratory flow from the rural area to the city.

The Sergipe government already admits that the money foreseen from the budget programs for coming years will not be enough to resolve the socioeconomic problems caused by population growth. It will only be possible, for example, to build 17,000 homes up to 1982, although the housing deficit today is around 60,000 units.

Unlike many states of the northeast, the northern region is the one which grows the most. It has a population of 5.8 million people, almost double those counted in 1970. Rondonia is the greatest example. Despite recording a growth rate of around 400 percent, Territorial Governor Jorge Texeira is not satisfied. The records of the Migration Screening Center, CETREMI, in Vilhena, indicate that the present population is more than 500,000 people.

That is why the governor decided to ask for a recount of the IBGE census because, according to him, "someone made a mistake." The IBGE representative, Glaber Gamaz, rejects the statement by state secretary of administration Francisco Erse, who alleges there is "negligence" by the agency. At any rate, the growth of Porto Velho was not accompanied by any growth of the infrastructure. The population went from 70,000 to 140,000 persons, but the health system is the same as that of the decade of the 60's and it is only now that the construction of a 250-bed hospital is being planned.

In Amazonas, the population grew from 955,000 to 1.4 million inhabitants but its growth was not uniform. Barcelos, the sixth largest municipality with 122,000 square kilometers, lost population, going from 12,000 people to nearly 10,000, while Manaus, with the attraction of the Free Zone, had a population explosion. It was the city which grew the most in the entire state in the past two censuses. Its growth should have been around 130 percent by comparison with 1970, with a forecast population growth of around 700,000 inhabitants.

A good population growth was also recorded in Para, going from 2.1 million to 3.5 million inhabitants. The places with the greatest concentrations other than the large cities are located at Tucuruí, where the second largest Brazilian hydroelectric powerplant is being built on the Tocantins River; Marabá because of recent settlement and the gold rush in Serra Pelada, and Conceição do Araguaia, where the search for land and its settlement is great.

#### The South Grows The Least

The southern region of the country, including Paraná, had the least population growth, with a rate of 1.43 percent per year and a total population of 19,022,590 inhabitants. Proof of this is Rio Grande do Sul, where more than 80 municipalities lost population between 1970 and 1980. With the exception of the metropolitan area, the census indicated a population loss in the entire state.

In greater Porto Alegre there were cities such as Alvorada, Campo Bom, Estância Velha and Gravataí where the number of inhabitants doubled. At this time this entire area is undergoing industrial expansion. Like the metropolitan region, municipalities of the state such as Caxias served as poles for attracting population. Parallel with growth was stagnation in many cases.

Santo Antonio da Patrulha, 82 kilometers from Porto Alegre, for example, was the municipality which lost the most inhabitants in the past decade: of 53,262 inhabitants in 1970, today it has only 41,360. Other cities in a condition like that of Santo Antonio da Patrulha are Encruzilhada do Sul, Cangucu and Tenente Portela. Even taking into account that the IBGE figures are not final, it is easy to see that lack of jobs is the factor responsible for the exodus of inhabitants from those cities.

Generally, the concern of the prefects who suffer a decline in population, is that of revenue distribution. With the decline in the number of inhabitants, the Municipal Revenue Sharing Fund resources will be reduced even more and the consequences will also be felt in the Legislative Branch. Wherever there is a decline in population, there will have to be fewer councilmen as of the next elections.

That is why there is an increasing number of councilmen and prefects who criticize the IBGE and demand a recount of the population. That is what the prefect of Jaguarao, Rio Grande, Aldo Francisco da Rosa, did, unsatisfied with the count of 23,262 inhabitants found by the census in his municipality. According to the prefect, there should be no fewer than 25,000. The same dissatisfaction exists in Bage and Passo Fundo.

A like situation exists in Santa Catarina. Of the 197 municipalities existing in the state, 64 had a population decline. Greater Florianopolis is one of the few privileged cases: It had an increase in the number of inhabitants. Overall, the state had a growth rate of about 27 percent, going from 2.9 million to 3.6 million in 1980.

Many prefects of the 64 municipalities of Santa Catarina do not like the results of the census because it is going to mean smaller federal and state allocations for the cities. The IBGE representative in Santa Catarina, Jose Lindolpho Garcez, acknowledges that situation: "We can do nothing about that because when the IBGE seeks that information, it only looks for the truth of numbers."

In Minas Gerais, the population increased from 11.4 million to 13.6 million, according to the preliminary results of the 1980 census. Those results indicate that the rates of vegetative growth were maintained, the population concentrated itself even more in some municipalities and the number of emigrants declined.

There was an accentuated population concentration in the 20 largest municipalities of Minas Gerais, which now have nearly 33 percent of all the population of the state. That reveals that the phenomenon of urbanization was even greater in that past decade. In the 1970 census, 52.7 percent of the people were concentrated in urban areas, while at this time the rate is 65 percent.

The two areas of the greatest population in the country are still the northeast and southeast, with 35.4 million and 52.5 million inhabitants respectively. There are 10 states in the northeast alone. The principal new development in that region is that Bahia is now the state with the largest population, exceeding that of Pernambuco, which had been in first place and now goes to third place. Ceara is in second place.

The population of Bahia grew from 7.5 million to 9.5 million in the last decade. Salvador by itself has 1.4 million people and is considered the fourth most populous city in the country behind Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte. The explanation of the small growth in the population of Recife is due mainly to the limited expansion of the agricultural frontier of the state.

The greatest demographic growth in Bahia took place in the metropolitan area of Salvador, the area of the petrochemical zone of Camacari and the industrial center of Aratu. The municipality of Lauro de Freitas, for example, grew almost 300 percent. Camacari restricted its expansion to half of that, 150 percent.

The population increased the most where there was the largest concentration of investments. This is a fact that is repeated in each census. In addition to Salvador and its metropolitan area, the coffee-growing areas of Vitoria da Conquista and Chapada Diamantina were confirmed as "poles of attraction." However, there are other cities close to important highways or cities benefitted by projects such as the Sobradinho Dam, which have a geometric population growth.

Behind Bahia, the state with the greatest demographic growth is Ceara. Its population increased by a million inhabitants during the last decade, reaching 5.3 million people now. The expectation of the experts, however, was not reached. They expected the population of Ceara would reach 5.8 million in 1980. There are 1.3 million people in Fortaleza alone.

The present demographic growth--around 21 percent--has declined in the last three decades in the state. However, the IBGE and the local press have received many complaints from the people who were not counted. That happened in Ceara and other states of the northeast.

The population increase in Pernambuco was also less than the IBGE forecasts. Even so, there was an increase from 5.1 million to 6.2 million people during the decade. Recife has 1.2 million inhabitants today, which places it in third place in the northeast region and in sixth place in the country.

The drought contributed to the demographic concentration in the metropolitan area of Recife, with an increase of 563,000 persons of a population of 2.3 million. The same thing happened in medium-size cities such as Petrolina, Salgueiro, Garanhuns, Caruaru and Vitoria de Santo Antao. The metropolitan region alone is responsible for 36 percent of the population growth of the state, although it contains a little more than a third of its inhabitants.

State Secretary of Planning Jorge Cavalcanti says that the migration to the southeast continues but on a lesser scale than in the 60's. Unlike what is happening in the south, the low levels of productive activities in the northeast "are responsible for the expulsion of large numbers of the population. "When those in the south sold their small holdings and equipment," he continues, "they obtained the money which made it possible for them to begin productive activities in the areas to which they migrated and where they settled as families. Those from the northeast, in addition to not having any money, almost always seek semiskilled work in the cities, and what is worse, they migrate without their families."

Maranhao is one of the states which had the greatest increase in population in the northeast. Secretary of Planning Joao Rebelo Viera has an explanation for this: "The 1970 census did not produce accurate figures; it is believed the population at that time was well above the figure disseminated, which now results in a surprisingly high figure." The population of Maranhao went from 2.9 million to 4 million.



In Rio Grande do Norte, preliminary IBGE figures on population were disappointing: It was expected there would be more than 2 million inhabitants, but the figure did not exceed 1.9 million. While 15 municipalities had 49.45 percent of the population, another 29, the majority of them in the central region, showed a population loss. The cities "swell," at the same time that others are called "ghost towns."

### Health, A Problem For All

The Parana Secretariat of Health was the only state agency pleased to receive the news that population in the state grew less than any other in the country. The IBGE estimated there were 10 million inhabitants in Parana but the number did not exceed 7.7 million, which guarantees the availability of a larger number of hospital beds to the population. The census results give the state the certainty that it still has the minimum number of beds established by the World Health Organization.

Even so, there is a lack of medical attention in cities where population increases are concentrated. However, reactions after the release of census results by the IBGE have been optimistic. An adviser of the Secretariat of Health justifies that behavior: "Since money is always in short supply, if the number of people is smaller than forecast, treatment could be better."

The official in charge of the Secretariat of Health Planning Department admits "It is very different to analyze the incidence of diseases in a population of 10 million than one of seven million." In view of that, he promises a "complete reevaluation of the systems used up to now in terms of prevention, particularly in the area of epidemics."

The Parana government intends to spend a billion cruzeiros in needy parts of the state. That will take a place in an area of 640,000 hectares in which 61 municipalities are located whose per capita income does not reach \$300. "The idea," said Secretary of Planning Vespero Mendes, "is to give medical attention to those who are left out of the conventional system of medical attention and who come to the large cities seeking treatment."

In Rondonia, where the greatest population growth in the country was recorded, difficulties are much greater than in Parana. A penitentiary was even turned into a hospital at a place where there was a medical treatment center with only 40 beds to take care of the entire BR-364 Region. Schools were closed and adapted so that they could admit the victims of malaria outbreaks.

In 1981, the territory's Secretariat of Health will have 650 million cruzeiros for the construction of seven hospitals. According to former Secretary of Health Jose Atalla, Porto Velho holds the world record for rabies in humans despite the fact that antirabies vaccinations have been given for three years.

In the area of vaccination, nation-wide campaigns such as that against poliomyelitis have been waged, however, there are doctors in Rondonia who charge that outdated or deteriorated vaccines have been injected, which have caused the appearance of cases of children with measles.

In Sergipe, there are only four beds for every 1,000 inhabitants. In the area of basic sanitation, the situation is similar: The sewer network is insufficient and the water supply system serves only one-third of the population of the state. General mortality rates are now 11.7 per 1,000, a rate which is affected by the infant mortality, which reaches 82.7 per 1,000 children under one year-of-age.

Maranhao is one of the states showing great population increase in the northeast. The government intends to build three health centers and 15 treatment stations in addition to completing one hospital. By 1982 it is the hope of technicians they will be able to inaugurate at least one hospital in each of the basic regions and 1,250 treatment stations.

The numbers revealed by the recensusing of Rio Grande do Sul led the Secretariat of Health and the Environment to reschedule its activities as of the beginning of next year. Secretary Germano Bonow asserts that treatment will be given with priority to the needy people who live in Greater Porto Alegre, Pelotas, Caxias, Santa Maria and Passo Fundo. That is one of the results of urbanization, since the census showed a more accentuated growth in those areas.

The Secretariat of Health is also preparing to revamp its estimates and begin a study for the execution of programs such as the mass vaccination of children under five to fight poliomyelitis, for example. Bonow believes that the preparation of a "sanitation plan" that includes a place for the final destination of sewage to prevent diseases, is important.

In the field of education, the situation is difficult. In Maranhao, more than 50 percent of the school-age population cannot be given schooling because of a lack of first-grade establishments. According to the government, 1981 shall be devoted to education but already experts acknowledge that it should not change the high rate of illiteracy because of the increase in the population.

In the next 2 years, the government believes that all its efforts will be only enough to eliminate the accumulated deficit plus "a slight decline in the illiteracy rate." The construction of 1,000 classrooms in the rural area is foreseen for 1981. Lay teachers (not trained) will be used to reach 60,000 children. At this time, 50 percent of the children enrolled do not receive a school lunch.

#### Education and Jobs, a National Shortage

The decline in population foreseen in the Parana census led state experts to place emphasis on improving the physical conditions of schools and now, on the quality of education. Practically the entire school network is idle in the afternoons. In the regions which lost population, hundreds of schools have already been closed. According to FUNDEPAR [expansion unknown] figures, more than 350 first-grade schools have been closed, primarily in the rural area, in 1980.

In recent years, nearly 700 schools were closed. Generally, the equipment is transferred to the needier urban areas. Such is the case of Cascavel, which some time ago received 340 classrooms but still shows a shortage of 200. There is also a shortage of classrooms in the metropolitan region but experts declare it is unlikely there will be a lack of space.

Three months ago, Rondonia Governor Jorge Teixeira said that 200,000 people need schoolrooms in the territory and that every 15 minutes a child under 15 years-of-age passes through the migrant screening center in Vilhena. To compensate for that shortage, the government has already announced that schools with 20 to 40 classrooms will be built in each municipal site in an attempt to reduce the percentage of students without schools.

The municipal directress of education, Berenice Luz da Silva, explains that 41,000 students were enrolled in Porto Velho alone in 1980 and that the number should exceed 50,000 in 1981. She and Secretary of Education Alvaro Lustosa Pires agree that the number of classrooms is insufficient and that it is necessary to increase the volume of construction.

In Rio Grande do Sul, the greatest concern is "reducing the drop-out rate and the flunking of first and second grade and supplementary education students." There are 90,000 teachers in the state today, taking care of a school population which exceeds two million students at both levels. They are scattered throughout 16,000 schools of which 12,000 are in urban areas. Another 90,000 students are enrolled in higher education.

More expenditures are needed to take care of education and unemployment. According to latest estimates, Rio Grande do Norte has 50 percent of its population unemployed.

By 1983, the Secretariat of Labor expects to offer 11,000 new jobs by acting as an employment agency (the workers will be employed on government projects) and by installing production microunits (public laundries and handicraft centers) and offering professional training courses.

In Curitiba, the greatest concern now is the lack of workers in the rural area of the state. Technicians estimate that more than 50 percent of the 800,000 migrant workers who lived in the interior have already left the state or have settled in urban areas. In the last cotton harvest, for example, the shortage of manpower was so great that growers paid as much as 50 percent of the value of the crop for cotton picking. Next season, with the recovery of coffee plantations and the increase in the cotton crop, the shortage will be even greater.

It will be necessary to attract the rural worker to the fields once more. Parana government officials believe that the system of sharecropping should be reinstated. Another idea is that of increasing the use of available manual labor, eliminating mechanized crops.

One of the great obstacles to the growth of the labor market in Rondonia is the lack of electric power. The generation of electricity is accomplished by using diesel oil. That makes the kilowatt the most expensive in the country. The solution is the construction of a hydroelectric powerplant.

The lack of human and financial resources, according to a Sergipe Government study, allows the state to use only "timid social and economic measures aimed at raising income levels and creating new and better jobs." The unemployment rate in the region of the lower San Francisco River, for example, reaches 60 percent in several municipalities.

Rio Grande do Sul government estimates indicate the need to create 90,000 jobs each year. Of that total, 80 percent should be concentrated in the area of Greater Porto Alegre, where 1,693 of the 22,295 industries of the state are located.

#### The Underemployment Problem

Underemployment is one of the greatest problems of Maranhao and is the highest in the country. The census indicates that of every four inhabitants of Maranhao, three are underemployed. The state secretary of labor says that this is a very "worrisome figure because if the population is in this condition, it indicates that the standard of living is very low." The government is thinking of development an agroindustry adapted to local conditions to absorb a large portion of that manpower.

The slow process of industrialization and the migration toward the cities affect the job supply even more. Hopes are placed on the aluminum plant Alcoa is installing and on the Carajas Project which overall represent somewhat more than 10,000 jobs. Another government idea is the installation of an unsophisticated "supportive" industry adjusted to the natural proclivities of the region.

In Minas, the government needs to create 135,000 new jobs annually, but in view of the census, the estimates of the Superintendency of Statistics and Information is that they will not go beyond 80,297. Because of that marked difference, the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte has the highest rate of unemployment of all the metropolitan areas of the country, 7.69 percent in October, according to the IBGE.

Housing is another serious problem in the country. In the territory of Rondonia, primarily in Porto Velho, there are literally auctions for rental housing. Whoever bids the highest gets to sign the contract. In addition to the lack of units, the situation is aggravated by the influx, since 1975, of scores of technicians assigned to work in the region. The government began renting houses of all types driving rents up even more.

In Parana, however, the government can allow itself the luxury of halting housing programs in regions in which there has been a population decline. According to a COHAPAR [Parana Housing Company] official, he reached the conclusion that "there are so many houses available with low rent that it is useless to offer houses for sale." Cianorte is one of those cities. In 1979 it had 53,000 inhabitants and now has only 49,000.

In other places such as Curitiba, the situation was reversed. In 1976 the capital of the state had nearly 3,000 wooden shacks. In four years that number doubled, despite the supply in that period of 1,000 new family-type houses. Greater problems also exist in towns around Curitiba, as is the case of Piraquara and Colombo, which have rates of growth of 12 percent per year. At this time the housing deficit of the metropolitan region of the state is 20,000 homes and there is no possibility that the government of Parana can take care of it in the short term.



In Rio Grande do Sul, the shortage is much greater--371,641 housing units. In the 15 years of existence of COHAB [Los Coat Housing Company] in the state, only 15,000 family-type houses were built, an average of 1,000 per year. Under the Amaral do Souza Administration, 7,753 buildings have either been begun or completed. The Housing Company is building 38,773 residential units now.

The improvement of infrastructure conditions includes basic sanitation. The Rio Grande Sanitation Company wants to install a system of sewers throughout the metropolitan area. With respect to water, the situation appears to be better. There is only one municipality, Portao, without a water-pipe system. It is 40 kilometers from the capital and has a population of 10,740. The concern of the secretary for Regional Development and Public Works, Alberto Hoffman is that "of being short of money."

In Maranhao, shortages are much greater than in Rio Grande do Sul. Of the 130 municipalities of the state, only the capital, Sao Luis has a good sewer network, although only partially used because of a lack of an ocean check valve. In the interior, collapse is total. Only two cities have a basic sanitation system: Imperatriz and Bacabal.

Sao Luis, Imperatriz and Bacabal are also the only ones privileged to have what is considered an acceptable water supply. In the other municipalities, underground piping is being awaited hopefully by the population. Up to the end of next year, some cities will be provided with a network 107,134 meters long.

In Rio Grande do Norte, 150 municipalities of the state will be electrified but only five percent of rural properties have electric power. In Parana, optimism is great. Government technicians expect to rapidly increase the percentage of the rural population served by the electric power network. Today it serves only five percent of the agricultural properties of the state.

#### Sanitation and Transportation, Two Challenges

In Rondonia, less than 30 percent of Porto Velho has a water and sewage system and Prefect Francisco Paiva declared recently that it was necessary to spend 800 million cruzeiros to improve the sanitation conditions of the capital. In other municipalities, only now is that work being initiated. Ji-Parana, with 80,000 inhabitants, has fewer than 3,000 water connections, while Vilhena, with 20,000 persons, does not have 600 connections.

In the transportation sector, development of technology is more rapid. Rio Grande do Sul is building a metropolitan train which will begin to operate in 1983 in an initial stretch of 27.5 kilometers between Porto Alegre and Sapucaia do Sul, serving a population of 1.5 million people. The train will carry up to 18,000 passengers per hour at a maximum speed of 90 kilometers per hour.

Another project is that of the aeromobile, a vehicle which is powered by air over a railway line. Four meters above the ground and at speeds of up to 240 kilometers per hour, it will be able to carry tens of thousands of people per day on a stretch 7.9 kilometers long. The state government also intends to make better use of rivers and bicycle paths for transportation.

The main problem of Maranhao is the interconnection of the roads which link production centers with consumer markets. The government goal is the construction of 3,000 kilometers of neighborhood roads in the next 2 years. Concerns about transportation are concentrated on Sao Luis.

Parana is now concerned with the construction of the Soybean Railroad, linking the growing zones of the state with the port of Paranagua as part of the program of export corridors. Parana has a good highway infrastructure now, with nearly 8,000 kilometers of paved roads plus 4,000 kilometers of neighborhood roads.

8908

CSO: 3001

## MERITS OF UNITING LEFTIST PARTIES DISCUSSED

## UPA Hails Unification

Santo Domingo EL NACIONAL in Spanish 28 Nov 80 p 8

[Text] The Patriotic Anti-Imperialist Union (UPA) hailed the call for unification of the leftist parties yesterday during a press conference by the former president, Prof Juan Bosch.

The UPA believes that the country's situation demands that revolutionary and anti-imperialist groups put aside the differences which have kept them apart.

In a written statement, the UPA expresses the belief that those differences are "subtle," and says that the revolutionary groups must campaign "for the formation of a powerful leftist democratic front."

He added that this front is "the fondest hope of the popular masses" at this time.

The UPA indicated that "faithful to the desire for unification which gave it birth, it is taking advantage of Professor Bosch's statements to reiterate to the country its willingness to rejoin the Dominican Liberation Party and other Dominican leftist organizations."

It said that the purpose of the meeting is to begin discussions which should result in the formation of the leftist front.

The statement, which was made on behalf of the UPA Executive Committee and signed by Franklin J. Franco, president, and Mateo Morrison, secretary of propaganda, claims that unification "cannot be put off any longer."

It said that it is, therefore, taking as a base "the economic crisis of the Dominican people and the changes in the international order which are imminent throughout the world in the coming months."

The UPA believes that unification of the left is the hope of the people, and it calls on all the revolutionary forces in the country "to form the democratic, revolutionary and anti-imperialist front desired by the entire country."

## PCD Opposed to Unification

Santo Domingo EL NACIONAL in Spanish 28 Nov 80 p 8

[Text] The Dominican Communist Party (PCD) considers it contradictory that the president of the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) should call for unification of Dominican leftist parties and want to head the organization.

In a written statement the PCD says that once again one can see the eagerness of the former president of the republic "to try to command, lead or head a movement, over the heads of possible allies, to whom he basically assigns the role of simple subordinates."

It adds that such a practice "appears to be an important part of his action within and outside of the PLD."

The PCD explains that one must distinguish between a call for unification based on reuniting the left with the exploited masses, on political agreement and on programs rooted in the social and class struggle, and general proposals for unity without a program of change for socialism.

In another part of its statement, the PCD says that "there are calls for unification which often cover up a divisive policy."

It adds that proposals for unification "from sectors which have not put aside sectarianism and which are not even capable of maintaining their own unity" are of little value.

It adds that Bosch "managed to distort our position on that problem and to refer to alleged unifying attitudes of the PLD and other leftist organizations, which, on the contrary, display divisions and subdivisions that in fact make unity difficult, although they say they are in favor of it."

It says that in the last few months, so many divisions have come out of the MPD [Dominican Popular Movement] and the CORECATO that they have given rise to the formation of about six different groups.

It indicated that the PLD spawned the Democratic Union and the Socialist Plan, "and now it has new and serious internal problems, more serious than before, because it is questioning the minimal effectiveness of the political principles on which it is based."

The statement indicates that the PCD has presented to the country its plan for transforming this society, "and we are mindful of the programmatic agreements as well as the unity which exists in the area of deeds and of the struggle."

### PCT Opposes Unification

Santo Domingo EL NACIONAL in Spanish 28 Nov 80 p 14

[Article by Freddy Antonio Cruz]

[Text] The chairman of the Communist Labor Party, Rafael Chaljub Mejia, believes that it would be impossible and dangerous at this time to unite the leftist groups in the Dominican Republic.

He believes that no one can unite those Dominican groups. He feels that the lion and the lamb can never be united in the same bloc. He cited, for example, the case of the Communist Party of the Dominican Republic (PACOREDO), which he described as "an agency of the PRD [Dominican Revolutionary Party] government and the systematic defender of this antipopular regime."

On the other hand, referring to accusations that public and human rights are being violated here, Chaljub said that "it would be an injustice" to compare the present situation with that which existed during the 12-year reform government of Dr Joaquin Balaguer.

"Indeed we emphasize that the rights the people have gained are not a gift from the PRD, nor are they a reward or mercy from President Antonio Guzman," said the communist leader. Then he said that the people have achieved those rights through struggle.

"Besides, their rights are threatened more every day by increasing repression," Chaljub Mejia commented on the program "Interviews," which is presented every day at 1300 hours on Onda Musical by newsmen Felix A. Gomez.

He maintained that the PRD cannot be separated from the government's actions, since President Guzman is a high official in that organization. "The PRD is the political prop of the government, and it was Pena Gomez who brought the regime to the place it now occupies, and in addition it is he who defends it against the masses.

Chaljub Mejia believes that for 1982 "the people must cease to view the PRD as an option for power."

Discussing other matters, he severely criticized capitalism, saying it is "our worst enemy." He said that capitalists do not attack each other, and that this is the basis for the PRD policy of wiping the slate clean for those who enriched themselves illegally during the previous administration. He indicated that the government is carrying out a repression similar to that of the Argentine military government. "The government, contrary to what its spokesmen are saying, has not respected human rights and has reinstated the barbaric practices of the Balaguer era," he declared.

Concerning the elections, he discounted them as a possible way for the workers to come to power, a goal which, in his opinion, could only be achieved through revolutionary violence, "not because they are fighters, but because the enemies of the people leave them no other choice."

Chaljub Mejia said that "we do not rule out elections as a tool in the struggle," and in 1982, he emphasized, "we would not find it inconvenient to participate in them if conditions warrant." He sees the electoral path as "a secondary method."

In addition, Chaljub Mejia attributes the fragmentation of the Dominican left to the following factors:

First: The social factor: the clout of the petty bourgeoisie throughout the country makes for too much sectarianism.

Second: Historical questions: The Dominican leftists came into being at a time when they had no tradition of organization here.

Third: They began to come forth just as the international movement suffered one of its greatest divisions after the death of Josef Stalin, having been split by a movement headed by former Soviet premier Nikita Krushchev.

However, he believes that that situation has been overcome, and "we look for a very promising future for the Dominican leftist movement." He lashed out, finally, at the so-called three-world theory suggested by Communist China, calling it "revisionist, confusing and reactionary from top to bottom."

He pointed out that this theory suggests a great union of reactionary parties and movements to confront the Soviets and, in addition, that at this time there is no possibility of revolution. "All these things confuse the people," Chaljub Mejia said in closing.

8735

CSO: 3010



## EDITORIAL SUPPORTS STRONG ANTICOMMUNIST POLICIES

Port-au-Prince LE NOUVEAU MONDE in French 15 Dec 80 p 1

[Editorial by J.A.M.: "Word from the Director"]

[Text] In all the countries of the world communist propaganda is absolutely pernicious, since it appeals continually to man's lowest instincts; it is the most abject form of demagoguery. It is made up only of fantastic, fallacious promises. From this comes great influence on the mind of the masses. Moreover communist propaganda is so full of subtleties that it is very hard to detect. It varies according to the temperament of each people it seeks to reach.

Thus, for us, where it is rather badly considered, those who are in charge of it are--contrary to any overt propaganda method--the first to try to convince those who seek to combat it that it does not exist, and at all events it could not have any real effect since communism in Haiti is condemned in advance to retain forever its ideological character since our milieu is far from being adapted to its development, etc. etc.

Obviously that is a tactic, just like any other tactic, intended to deceive the partisans of Order; at the same time it is an admission of the danger that marxism would involve for us, if luck, always so important, happened to favor it. We have kept in mind the admission, without being taken in by the tactic. Unfortunately, many people have let themselves be taken in, so much so that during our strong and never-ending campaign, several colleagues and often even friends have asked us if we were not fighting an--imaginary adversary. All the intrigues that have been mounted against us to try to reduce us to silence enables us to assert just the contrary. Adversaries! we have met them just about everywhere and sometimes where we least expected to find them. But we have never lacked faith and courage and we have conducted our battle with the robust enthusiasm inspired by our just and noble cause.

I wished to disclose to you these comments--I made them in 1936, just 44 years ago.

This means, you understand, that our anticommunist position is not new.

9772

CSO: 3100

EDITOR'S LETTER CALLS FOR EXPLANATION OF ARRESTS

Port-au-Prince LE PETIT SAMEDI SOIR in French 13-19 Dec 80 p 3

[Article: "Open Letter From Our Director to Minister Chanoine To Ask for Clarification of the Arrest of Pierre Clitandre and Jean Robert Herard"]

[Text] Port-au-Prince 1 December 80

His Excellency Jean-Marie Chanoine

Secretary of State for Information and Public Relations

At the office

Mr Secretary of State

I hasten to bring to your attention the fact that last Friday 28 November towards 7 pm the editor in chief and assistant editor in chief, PETIT SAMEDI SOIR, Messrs Pierre Clitandre and Jean-Robert Herard, were manhandled and then arrested by four armed civilians.

Since then the steps I have taken have proved vain and I have no news about my collaborators. Therefore I hereby, Mr Secretary of State, request your assistance, as supervisory Ministry, to clarify these deplorable and notorious kidnappings. Messrs Clitandre and Herard are independent journalists who have always had faith in the provisions of Article 17, and who have always honored their profession by the rectitude of their conduct and the objectivity of their writing.

I should like to emphasize that these acts of kidnapping, which also involve about 20 other journalists of the spoken and written media, create real concern within the journalistic profession.

Mr Secretary of State, at a time when, in an interview with the daily LE MATIN you extol dialogue and provide assurances that the chief of state M J Duvalier, wishes to continue to govern democratically, this series of arrests which afflicts the group of independents raises many questions, leading us to ask if this is the end of the springtime and the triumph of the Duvalier hard line.



Mr Secretary of State we citizens must all undergo the rigors of the law if we should forget ourselves to the extent of violating the law. But we all would like to be treated within the framework of legality and not arrested at nightfall like common thieves, by unknown armed persons, intolerant and caring little for the law they are called on to uphold.

Mr Secretary of State, when the governing authorities in less than 12 hours proceed to the arrest of journalists from PETIT SAMEDI SOIR, Radio Metropole, Radi Haiti Inter, Radio Cacique, Regard, Inter-Jeune, Fraternity, Coquerico, etc. and of an influential member of the Haitian League of the Rights of Man, without counting other noted personalities who have made their mark on their surroundings, I see the collapse of 10 years of struggle for the restoration of an order where freedom of speech, dialogue, disagreement and criticism while respecting others, seem to have been assured. And I have reason to wonder whether this first flick of the net ought to be seen as a move to stun before making a decisive blow. It would be unfortunate for a fragile, humiliated, illiterate little country, increasingly discredited and which cannot straighten itself out and get back on its feet without a tete a tete with all the vital and progressive forces of the nation, regardless of the political beliefs held.

Mr Secretary of State, the relatives and friends of Messrs Pierre Clitandre and Jean-Robert Herard are sorely troubled. They are worried, very worried, since they know that in the past a number of Haitian journalists imprisoned under such conditions have never been heard from again. They would be happy, and I along with them, to learn the place of their detention, the mistakes they are blamed for, and we also ask, Mr Secretary of State, for your intervention for their liberation if the judge has not confirmed their detention by a well-founded decision.

I consider it my duty to take this step also for all the other colleagues arrested last 28 November in often humiliating circumstances.

Those who in town always stood up for the misfits and today find themselves without the means of defence to plead their own case.

It would be an act of justice, Mr Secretary of State, for the preservation of that Haitian democracy for which you have always pledged support.

Please accept my thanks and patriotic greetings.

Djeudonne Pardin

Director General of the independent journal PETIT SAMEDI SOIR

Certified copies to: Dr Frantz Medard, Secretary of State for the Interior and for National Defence

Re: Raymond, Secretary of State for Justice

To all the spoken, written, televised national and international media.

9772

CSO: 3100

## INFLATION REPORTED AS REACHING 26.5 PERCENT

Mexico City EL DIA in Spanish 6 Dec 80 p 8

[Text] According to an announcement made yesterday by the Bank of Mexico, during November the national consumer price index rose 1.7 percent, thereby bringing the cumulative total for this year to 26.5 percent.

The central banking institution noted that the consumer price index in Mexico City also showed an increase of 1.7 percent, while the wholesale price index in that same city rose 0.9 percent. Hence, the cumulative total for those two indexes as of the 11th month of 1980 is 26.3 and 23.9 percent, respectively.

For the third consecutive month, the Bank of Mexico pointed out, "Despite the official increase in the price of milk, the rates of increase in the consumer indexes are under 2 percent, a figure which predominated in the increments of previous months; and, in the case of the wholesale index, the increases are less than or equivalent to 1 percent."

It also gave assurance that the rise in the index during the latter part of the year "is a clear reflection of the reduction in the inflation rate, as a result of the increase in the aggregate supply of the agricultural sector and the anti-inflationary economic policy measures."

The central banking institution explained that the rise in the national consumer price index was a result, "basically, of the increase in the prices of cow's milk, housing rentals, poultry, real estate taxes, bar and restaurant services, high-test gasoline, automobiles, women's clothing and packaged bread." It noted that, "In addition, there were considerable increases in the prices of other goods and services, but they did not have a decisive effect on the index. They include disinfectants, green chiles, liquor, children's clothing, household bleaches and overcoats. The effects of these increases were eased by the reduction in prices of tomatoes, oranges, onions and peas."

With regard to the rise in the consumer price index in Mexico City, the Bank of Mexico explained that it was caused "primarily" by the change in the prices of the aforementioned products on the national index, except for the real estate tax. Also noteworthy because of their size were the increases in prices of records, dry cleaning service and men's suits.

## JLP: 6 YEARS IN JAIL FOR 'FRONTMEN'

Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 30 Nov 80 Sec A pp 1, 21

[Text] President Lopez Portillo proposed reforms to the Federation's tax code to prevent tax evasion by national and multinational business firms which use Mexican frontmen, in a bill which he sent to the Chamber of Deputies. He proposes jail sentences of up to 6 years for those who engage in this fraudulent maneuver.

In the whereas clauses preceding the reform bill, the president of the republic states that anyone who agrees to, or allows the use of his name to represent the business dealings of someone else should be punished, whether he be a civil servant or a mere private citizen.

The reforms are intended to eliminate the omissions currently being committed, to enter one's name in the registry of taxpayers and to avoid the demand for entry in other instances, attributing to oneself the activities of another person, as one's own.

It is stipulated that, in instances wherein Mexican civil servants or government workers commit such violations, they will be located as residents of Mexico, even though they may reside abroad, owing to the nature of their official activities, for a period of time longer than that regarded as legal in the present code. A jail penalty is also established for those concealing the crime and seeking profit from this alleged protection.

These reforms apply the penal liability to those who, without previous consent following the commission of the crime and without having participated therein, help the accused in any way to evade the authorities' investigations, dissociate or conceal themselves from the action of the latter, alter, destroy or cause the disappearance of the evidence, proof or instruments of the crime, or insure for the accused the product or profit thereof.

The reform bill expands the concept of residence on national territory, also regarding the natural or juridical persons residing abroad who have one or more establishments in the country as being liable for all the acts or activities in which they engage.

The jail sentence established by the reform bill includes terms of from 1 to 6 years for those who attribute to themselves the activities of another person, or who allow the use of their name to represent the business dealings of others.

The jail sentence is also established for those who conceal the crime, and who attempt to profit from this alleged protection from it.

In the document, the federal executive stipulates that whoever allows or tolerates the use of his name to represent the business dealings of another "must be subject to the full weight of the law."

2909

CSO: 3010

## PCM MEMBER DISCUSSES PARTY REORGANIZATION

Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 29 Nov 80 Sec A pp 7, 8

[Article by Arturo Martinez Nateras: "Renovation in the PCM"]

[Text] One of the signs of weakness in any leadership entity, whether it be state, social or political, crops up in the mania of an overthrow. The conspiracy syndrome appears primarily when those holding power note that the citizens or members of organizations are fighting for changes and pressuring to participate in the government, or else to promote reforms. The first reaction from the authorities is withdrawal into a shell, or repression, as an obvious act of self-defense.

However, in mature societies and organizations, precedence is given to democracy, and the custom of dialog, with the conviction that, in such a complex world or, if we are referring to our country, in a society such as ours, it is essential that there be a free, open exchange of views as part of the process of approaching the reality.

A party the focal point of whose policy is the struggle for democracy cannot fail to be an example of democracy in its internal life. Otherwise, its slogans would appear to the citizens as formulas devoid of content.

In politics, the force of example is infinite. Today, the PCM [Mexican Communist Party] leadership must act in keeping with the public statements that it makes on the methods and means of leading the country. It is impossible to struggle for democracy on the outside. Authoritarianism is a scourge both within and outside of parties.

The PCM's leadership has a splendid opportunity at present to show the country that the national planks and plans of a democratic party exceed the talk itself, and are embodied in real life. The occasion was offered by the 13 signers of the Manifesto for the Renovation of the PCM. The reaction from a large portion of the Communist Party has been one of support and sympathy. Some are in full agreement; others and I include myself among them, sharing agreement, demarcations and approximations, support and uphold the right of the 13 and of any PCM member to express an opinion on the internal situation openly and publicly.

There are some who are opposed to their views, and this is a sign of political health. In spite of everything, some comrades have reacted angrily. There are

those who seek the dark thread of conspiracy; some have become philologists, and claim to have already caught the authors in their tricks; and there is no dearth of those seeking backers and complaining about "such a costly" involvement. The signs of internal reprisals against the members of the apparatus who signed the supporting document are already evident.

The Central Committee's executive commission met, and released the following communique: "The PCM Central Committee opened its 22d plenary session on 15 and 16 November. The topic which the national leadership studied at this plenary meeting was the status and the tasks of the CC in preparation for the 19th National Congress. Owing to the need to meet other work commitments, the CC unanimously (underlined by the 11) decided to take a break, and to continue the discussion on 3 December of this year. However, proceeding to the conclusions, seven members and six alternate members of the CC published in the press of 21 November the individual conclusions of these comrades, which were obviously the result of their own debate (underlined by AMN).

"This procedure interfered with the CC discussion. In continuing its sessions, the latter entity will deal with all the matters cited in the document of the aforementioned comrades."

So much for the document. It seems clear to me that the Central Committee has included on its agenda the discussion of the document, and that the communists, the left as a whole, the democrats and all Mexicans with a free conscience are going to follow the results of this meeting with interest. It is a matter of ascertaining whether action is being taken with democratic procedures, a practice that would put an end to the period of debates with division and expulsions, or whether the specter of the past will be revived again, and involve us in an unsurmountable crisis.

The document of the 13, as well as the backing document, are a normal part of the process of internal discussion and a contribution to the debate and the search of the necessary party. It would be a very good thing if the Central Committee plenum were to avoid the administrative temptation, and gear itself to the new situation that has been created in the country and the party. All of us PCM members will be attentive, perhaps more than ever before, to what happens therein, and the eyes of the national political world will also follow with interest this new episode in the history of the PCM.

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CSO: 3010



## ARMY MANEUVERS NEAR GUATEMALAN BORDER ANNOUNCE

Mexico City EL SOL DE MEXICO in Spanish 4 Dec 80 Sec A p 15

[Text] The Armed Forces of Mexico, as part of its general program of action for war situations, and for the first time in our nation's history, is planning a huge simulated combat in the southeastern states, in which the available military capacity and the readiness of the military resources at hand will be put to the test.

Starting in the early hours of next Saturday, the Chiapas jungle will be converted into a combat zone. There, the military battalions which will maintain control of the patrols and aircraft will be established, but first the areas of Tabasco and Campeche will be attacked.

For the first time, the Mexican troops will be faced with a completely simulated battle, and will run the same risks as in war; because in some action they will have to cross firing areas and swampy sites.

According to the explanation given yesterday by the Secretariat of National Defense, one of the main objectives of these exercises is to provide military training on the control of information obtained in the combat zone, and knowledge of how to protect war correspondents.

For this purpose, a special invitation was tendered the national press, which will be provided with all facilities to perform its work, but with the limitations and control that the situation entails.

It was also announced that the reporters will have the necessary communications facilities for sending their news reports, but it was warned that all of them would be intercepted for censorship, and only those which do not disclose secret situations and strategic positions of the "enemy" and the Mexican Army would be allowed to be transmitted.

The purpose of the latter is to prevent reports from having an effect at a certain time on the relations between the country in combat and the allied nations, according to the preliminary explanations given by the national defense ministry.

The sham battle will last for 15 days. No information was released on the operational devices for carrying out the action, although there was constant mention of the fact that the strategic combat area would be located in the Chiapas jungle.

The results of this activity will be announced after next Wednesday, and at that time a detailed report will be made available concerning our country's military readiness.

2909

CSO: 3010

COUNTRY SECTION

MEXICO

BRIEFS

SHIP PURCHASE FROM SPAIN--Yesterday, Ricardo Chazaro Lara, secretary of the navy, signed a contract with the Bazan National Military and Naval Construction Company of Spain whereby a commitment has been made for the construction of six ships of the coast guard type for the Mexican Navy. The investment, which amounts to the sum of 2.363 billion pesos, is one of the largest that has ever been made insofar as equipment for the Mexican Navy is concerned, according to the report, and also represents a significant step in the program to modernize the facilities for guarding and surveillance of the national seas and the exclusive zone. [Text] [Mexico City EL DIA in Spanish 9 Dec 80 p 13] 2909

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